THE New Republic

What Is Our Agenda for a Summit Meeting?

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The Case for Disengagement

First of Three Articles by Denis Healey

Has de Gaulle's Time Come? . . *Percy Winner*

The Capitalist Manifesto . . . . . *Carl Kaysen*

Eisenhower-Nixon Pact . . *Gerald W. Johnson*

HOW LONG WILL THE RECESSION LAST?

Paul H. Douglas *Richard A. Lester*

Gerhard Colm *Matthew Kust* *George Katona*

MARCH 17, 1958

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Washington Wire

Which End's Up?

PUSHING our studious way from page 1 to page 54 of last Sunday's *New York Times* to follow Eisenhower's anti-recession plans our astonished eyes fell on the most electrifying distasteful collection of female fashions that we have encountered in a long time. In our innocence we paused at one advertisement actually believing it was a caricature of flapper days. But no, "Mary goes to Paris for you," trilled the advertisement; "we've bought you the divine designs from the great fashion houses; discovered for you the little genius perfections hidden in the by-ways of Paris."

One sweet creature seemed to be entangled in a potato bag, gathered about her knees in a ruffled hobbleskirt. Another peeped out in an ashamed way from a sort of juvenile sailor suit with a waistline dropped down below amidships. Lord & Taylor, next pages, showed a couple of formless creatures whose sex was only evident by their protruding heads and shoes. Experience has taught us that a man can do absolutely nothing at such moments except bow his head and hope for better weather. An all-male Lysistrata-style strike would get nowhere. It would be nice to think the current recession is simply a consumers' protest against bad taste: bad taste in Paris clothing and bad taste in Detroit car styles ("if two headlights are good, four must be better"). They do have one thing in common: neither fashions nor car styles tell you any longer at first glance which is front and which is rear.

Well, well, we must take a greater interest in styles. In the meantime, God bless the ladies!—and be thankful that under their incomprehensible wrappings their chassis (like the cars) remains basically unchanged.

Waiting for March

TO GET BACK to the recession, the big story here, of course, is the leap in unemployment. It dominates everything else—endangers Eisenhower's effort to curb Congress till next month's figure is in. The story is simple. Seasonal unemployment normally peaks in February, starts to fall in March (as outdoor construction resumes). Official figures are published one month later: that means we are now getting the mid-February unemployment bad news. Eisenhower says, "Wait for the March upturn!" (available around April 10). This seasonal upturn is practically a sure bet like a spring crocus.

Strong Medicine

THE ADMINISTRATION has hoped to buy time by the news of this expected improvement. The Eisenhower economists sincerely believe that the recession will cure itself before very long—and they may be right for all we know. A majority of academic economists probably agree with them, although many are noticeably less optimistic than they were. The Administration is offering a series of palliatives but wants to hold off the big tax-cut medicine till next month.

The Administration knew by its Census Bureau figures at the end of last week that the forthcoming jump in unemployment would be big — in the neighborhood of 600,000. By a clever piece of economic analysis Senator Douglas (D, Ill.) was able to deduce the same thing and forewarn the Democrats. A former economics professor, Douglas applied an arithmetic ratio to last week's new figure of "claimants for unemployment insurance," using it as a base came up with the guess of 5,200,000 unemployed accordingly. To this Douglas adds the part-time unemployment estimate and demands a tax cut. It is significant that GOP Tories like Senator Barry Goldwater, and Rep. Richard Simpson (Pa.), Chairman of the GOP Congressional Campaign Committee, now agree with him.

If this reporter had to guess he would say that the acute phase of the recession would, indeed, probably show signs of passing fairly soon—in the next month or so—though full recovery may not come till year-end. But nobody can be sure, and the Administration is already hedging its bet. It has suddenly discovered that a tight money policy can produce a recession, but that relaxing the policy does not produce a recovery. It has a list of recovery measures which it should have offered before.

This month will put almost intolerable pressure on the Administration. Democrats seek to create a public image of themselves as eager to act as against a "do-nothing" Administration. But they too, are restrained from a tax cut by the possibility of a March pick-up. A tax cut is like a shot of adrenaline: if given to low-income groups in the form of excise reductions it immediately increases purchasing power with multiplying effects in the economic bloodstream. The Administration thinks business will recover by itself but also knows that beyond a certain point a recession grows cumulative and much harder to cure.

These are tricky and dangerous decisions. Our guess is that Eisenhower will just barely hold off Congress from a tax cut till the April 10 unemployment figures are in (meanwhile accelerating some expenditures) and that if these don't show a greater-than-seasonal improvement Congress will shoot the works

Notes

WE LISTENED to smiling Soviet Ambassador Menshikov at the Press Club last week: he looks disconcertingly like an American capitalist. . . . It now seems accepted that there will be a Summit conference in 1958. . . . Look for little items or speeches from Nixon hinting that if he were President he would act boldly against the recession; here is a new case where he fears Eisenhower's troubles may brush off onto him. . . . FCC Chairman Doerfer may follow Commissioner Mack; he has admitted accepting gifts and favors from the industry he is supposed to regulate. . . . Five men who helped prepare the suppressed Gaither Report to restore the lost sense of US urgency in a book this week, *Soviet Progress v. American Enterprise,* an alarming study. . . . Reuther's auto workers union still seems to have the better of it at the Senate inquiry into the bitter 4-year Kohler strike; Kohler's counsel publicly rejected arbitration.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *Impractical Politics*

SIRS:

IN his clever and generous review of my *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* Ian Watt quotes me as saying religion "moves me even more than Marxism." This is, of course, just a misprint—"moves" should be "bores"—but what a misprint!

Otherwise, I have no complaints,

(Continued on page 24)

Summit Strategy

MR. KHRUSHCHEV has said he would like to come to Washington, and the information throws a flood of light on the somewhat puzzling question of why the Soviet Government should be so keen on a "Summit" meeting when the chances of reaching agreement on any Russian demands are clearly extremely small. It may, of course, be argued with some truth that the mere campaign for such a meeting is greatly benefiting Soviet propaganda at present, because it divides the West and wins sympathies in Asia. But it is also very likely that the meeting itself, if held under the conditions now envisaged by the Soviet leaders, will substantially benefit their major policy objectives even if no agreement is reached on any point of substance.

To see this, we need only envisage clearly what these major objectives of Soviet policy are at the present time. First and foremost among them are still, on one side, the consolidation of the Soviets' own hold on Eastern Europe, and on the other the disorganization of NATO's defense effort in Western Europe. Ideally, Mr. Khrushchev would like to obtain formal Western, and particularly US, recognition that the Sovietization of Eastern Europe is accepted as irreversible and all diplomatic and propagandist efforts to support the enslaved nations in their struggle for independence will cease; ideally, he would also like to see NATO dissolved, or superseded by an all-round non-aggression pact, and American forces withdrawn across the Atlantic. But he knows perfectly well that neither objective is at present attainable in this ideal form—and certainly both cannot be reached together. Hence he will count a Summit meeting a success if, with or without formal agreement, it creates a psychological situation which convinces the people of Eastern Europe that they have been *de facto* abandoned by the West—and convinces the peoples of Western Europe that the efforts and risks involved in keeping NATO's defenses up to date are unnecessary.

If Mr. Khrushchev appeared in Washington, flanked by a bevy of satellite leaders from Eastern Europe, the first psychological objective would have been reached before the discussions began; and he knows it. Moreover, he would have gained a secondary objective which must be vital to him personally: if he were received by the President of the United States as the authorized "Summit spokesman" of the Soviet Union, the final seal of international legitimacy would be placed on his victory in the internal struggle for power. As for his second main objective—the disorganization of NATO—it would of course be best served by Western acceptance of the Rapacki plan for an atom-free zone in central Europe, or some similar agreement which would preclude the atomic equipment of NATO's forward forces and the spread of IRBM bases in Western Europe, without, on the other hand, requiring Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Failing that, Khrushchev might be well content if an atmosphere of "relaxation of tension" had the effect of making these defense measures impossible in terms of West German, British or French domestic politics, even without formal agreement.

Any reflection along these lines thus makes the case for Secretary Dulles'

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refusal to commit himself to a "Summit meeting" unless there is a definite prospect of successful, concrete negotiation very formidable indeed.

Unfortunately, there is another side to the argument: The Soviet campaign with its idiotic suggestion that the survival of humanity depends on an early Summit meeting has been so successful in parts of Western Europe that the disorganization of NATO may just as well be brought about by our refusal to hold such a meeting as by our consent to hold it in the atmosphere of vague talk preferred by the Soviets. In normally calm and steady Britain, in particular, both the government and the responsible opposition leaders are plainly running scared of a muddle-headed but vocal "anti-bomb movement" whose strength nobody can gauge as yet: hence the government's willingness to accept Summit talks without thorough previous exploration, and the Labour Party's acceptance of the nonsensical idea that this was the best hope of "breaking the deadlock" and its demand that no physical steps toward the installation of IRBM's on British soil should be taken pending the talks. If this kind of outlook spreads in Western Europe, we may eventually be forced to hold the talks under the worst possible conditions; moreover, the very fact of the situation in which Russia seems to be urging "peace talks" while our government is "refusing" them is bringing Mr. Khrushchev important secondary propaganda gains, particularly in Asia.

How did we get into this dilemma, and—more important—how can we get out of it? To some extent, we are now paying for years of loose talk about "massive retaliation." Instead of understanding that H-bombs and long-range missiles have made a world war all but unthinkable, and soberly viewing the "balance of terror" as the ultimate guarantee against it, many people have fallen into an apocalyptic mood in which they expect any local conflict to lead to race suicide, and conclude that survival depends on quickly achieving "peace" with the Soviets, never mind how. Obviously, a democratic public opinion which has got into that totalistic state seriously handicaps negotiation with the Soviets. We cannot afford to yield to such a mood; it must be resisted by every means of political argument.

But the best answer to the simple but false alternatives of talks now or race suicide soon remains positive, concrete and plausible plans of our own for dealing with the main causes of East-West conflict, and to insist on making them the main subject of diplomatic discussion—with or without a summit conference. The real fault of Mr. Dulles—and let us not be deceived, he and not Mr. Eisenhower, is the architect of our policies—is not his reluctance to hold talks on Mr. Khrushchev's terms, but his failure to put forward intelligible terms of his own. If we had pushed forward with serious and watertight proposals for military disengagement in Central and Eastern Europe, and for a controlled limitation of arms deliveries to the Middle East, we should not have got into our present defensive position; if we put them forward now, we can still transform it.

Failing that, there remains one major subject on which genuine East-West agreement may actually be attainable now—not in the kind of Summit jamboree envisaged by the Soviets, but in the small circle of atomic powers. If hard pressed, the Soviets may well admit that they are as interested as ourselves in preventing the production of atomic weapons by fourth, fifth and sixth powers, and willing to try out international control machinery for enforcing such a ban. British opinion would probably be

EXCELSIOR

ATOMIC night was falling fast,
Before the President at last
Prepared to bear through snow and ice,
A banner with the strange device,
Excelsior!

Lights gleamed in windows of the West
As upward to the peak he pressed;
To rod and clubs he bade good-bye,
Repeating, not without a sigh,
"Excelsior!"

"Try not the Summit!" Dulles said,
"The slippery glacier looms ahead."
But from the spectral mountain's height,
A voice rang through the startled night,
"Excelsior!"

"Avoid," cried NATO, "the abyss!
Seek not the awful precipice!"
From freezing slopes a challenge rung,
In accents of the Russian tongue,
"Excelsior!"

"O, stay!" warned Adenauer, "Beware,
And heed my oft-repeated prayer.
This Summit climb is bad for Bonn."
The President answered with a groan,
"Excelsior!"

At daybreak, news-hounds on his track,
Inquired if he were turning back,
Or whether he proposed to change
That queer device, so weird and strange,
Excelsior?

Or would he climb against advice,
And on the Summit break the ice?
Speechless, but dutiful he stood—
He would not answer if he could.
Excelsior!

SAGITTARIUS

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relieved to stop Britain's own effort in this field, whatever government may say at first; and once Britain agreed to a Russo-American monopoly, others would be unlikely to challenge it. Such a step would be a real contribution both to reducing the risk of atomic war, to testing disarmament machinery, and to damping the growth of atomic hysteria; and it would not inherently be dependent on any other agreement between the Soviets and ourselves.

Of course, there are difficulties along that road, too; the question would arise of stopping not only production, but distribution by the Soviets or our government of bombs to third parties, and this would quickly raise the problem of disengagement from another angle. But it is an approach that has a chance of success; it would be immensely popular; and it would free us from the absurd dilemma of consenting to a kind of conference which we know will be useless and indeed harmful, or appearing to be opposed to negotiation. It is worth trying.

Misleading the President

THE INVESTIGATION by the House Committee on Legislative Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission, and more particularly of Commissioner Richard A. Mack, has retained the unedifying place on the front pages of the newspapers to which it early laid claim. Many unpleasant facts concerning Mr. Mack were brought out properly enough, to be sure, but we might well have been spared the sanctimonious self-righteousness of Chairman Harris' statement expressing pity for Mr. Mack and asking him to resign. It is scarcely the business of a member of the House of Representatives to demand resignations from Presidential appointees, and —questions of taste to the side—the moral outrage Mr. Harris was able to summon does not sit particularly well on a man who has no intention of investigating colleagues of his own, who, in turn, have done much to create the atmosphere that breeds the likes of Mack.

Meanwhile, however, we have, through the incidental agency of Mr. Harris' committee, been vouchsafed an insight into the operation of the Office of the President of the United States which is extremely revealing and which has seemingly escaped general notice.

It will be remembered that among the things that turned up early in the investigation (turned up derivatively, as a belated dividend of the McClellan Committee's abortive 1956 investigation of California lawyer Murray Chotiner) was a letter from Sherman Adams to Chotiner reporting that Adams had been in touch with the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board about a case of Chotiner's pending before that agency. At his press conference on February 27, the President was asked by Clark R. Mollenhoff of the *Des Moines Register-Tribune* whether in his view it was proper for Adams to consult the head of an independent agency in behalf of a private litigant. The President answered that under the applicable statute he had jurisdiction, appellate in nature, so to speak, over decisions by the CAB concerning foreign airline routes, and that he saw nothing wrong in a member of his staff seeking to inform himself about a case so falling within the Presidential jurisdiction. "So, I would assume it is so in that case," the President concluded.

Of course, the President was right on his law, and as this journal pointed out some weeks ago, there is nothing necessarily improper in private contacts between the Office of the President and an independent agency, *where by statute the President is given a role to play*. But, the case in which Mr. Adams intervened in behalf of Mr. Chotiner does not fall within this category. Not remotely. No foreign air routes were involved, and as the *Washington Post* observed: "If the letters mean what they appear to mean, Mr. Adams perpetrated a gross impropriety by intervening with a quasi-judicial agency in an affair that should not have concerned the White House." And so the questioner attempted to point out. "Mr. President," he started, "on that line—". Mr. Eisenhower cut him off: "I don't want anything more about that."

One should take reasonable care in drawing inferences from this press conference episode. Nevertheless, it is surely not farfetched, in view of what one knows of the President, his methods and his powers of application, to surmise that the President would not spontaneously come up with fairly particular and accurate information concerning his statutory duties under the Civil Aeronautics Act unless they had recently been called to his attention. It is also improbable that Mr. Hagerty would have let the President walk into a press conference in the midst of the brouhaha caused by the House Committee on Legislative Oversight, without alerting him to the fact that Sherman Adams had become involved, and that the President might be asked about it. The picture that emerges, therefore, is that of a President misled by his staff.

If our surmise is correct, this is not the first time the President has been so used. There was inescapable evidence at the time of the Dixon-Yates scandal that the President had been similarly misled about the role played by a private Boston financier in the negotiation of certain government contracts. One can only say that it is all very well and good for neat little arrangements to be made with a view to the eventuality of possible Presidential disability. A more pressing problem is who is to be President in the meantime.

Unevenhanded Justice

WILLIAM E. JENNER, of Indiana, the *New York Times* recently remarked with unaccustomed heat, "is doing a service to the nation by retiring from the Senate this year." Meanwhile, committee hearings have recently been held on one of Mr. Jenner's valedictory gestures—a bill to

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deprive the Supreme Court of the United States of jurisdiction to hear the kind of cases in which, as Mr. Jenner sees it, the Court has of late rendered wrong decisions.

The cases Mr. Jenner has in mind raised a variety of legal issues. What they have in common is that they all touched on what Mr. Jenner, in his own special sense, has long and lovingly called the fight against Communism. And to say that Mr. Jenner thinks the Court's decisions in these cases "wrong" is to paraphrase the Senator's sentiments very loosely indeed. Offering his bill in the Senate last July, Mr. Jenner called the decisions "twisted," "dishonest," "pro-Communist," and "treason's biggest victory."

A number of the decisions that trouble Mr. Jenner could be reversed by legislation expressing the Congressional will on the substantive issue involved. This is true, for example, of the *Nelson* case, which struck down Pennsylvania's Little Smith Act. Others merely imposed procedural requirements that, if followed, need not stand in the way of effectuating any legislative or executive purpose. Mr. Jenner does not propose to deal with the results that displease him in any such orderly and traditional fashion, however. By depriving the Court of a portion of its jurisdiction, he wants to leave the final decision in such cases with the state courts and with the lower federal courts. The consequence would be that the Constitution might mean one thing in Pennsylvania and another in Oregon and yet another in some other state or judicial circuit. This is not only intolerable on principle —the first principle of law, which is evenhanded application—but preposterous from any practical view.

The Jenner bill strikes out blindly. As Mr. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., said in a superb statement before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the bill, if not unconstitutional, is certainly "anti-constitutional." Opposition to it on that score is so weighty (the American Bar Association has come out against it), that we may confidently expect the Senate, under the effective leadership of Mr. Hennings (D) of Missouri, to reject it. Yet an ominous note was struck in the Senate in July when Mr. Jenner first offered his bill. Richard Russell (Ga.), traditional leader of the Southern Democrats, rose to congratulate him on his "able speech" and at least tentatively tendered him support.

Nixon: The Tender Trap

Reprints of Margaret Halsey's much-discussed article in the January 13 issue of *The New Republic* are now available at the single copy rate of 10 cents; 10 copies 75 cents; 25 copies $1.50, and 50 copies $2.50.

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Witchbeam

UNTIL recently, we could not bring ourselves to agree with the theory, first advanced after Sputnik I, according to which the Russians succeeded with Sputnik only because they stole the "secret" of successful rocketry from the United States. It was a nice theory, but there was this about it: United States rockets have not, by comparison, been conspicuously successful.

Recent newspaper reports, however, have shed new light on the matter, and we are prepared to reconsider our position. These reports are to be found in the papers for March 6, on the comics page, in the strip called "Smilin' Jack." A Russian agent, known simply as "Head," has captured Smilin' Jack's brother, Brassnucks, and is teasing him. Let's listen . . .

Do you begin to get the drift? Brassnucks does. He answers, between clenched teeth . . .



Which prompts this satiric rejoinder from Head . .


WISE LAD! REMEMBER THE ROCKET TEST FAILURES AT CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA?
RUSSIAN SUBS WITH "WITCH-BEAM" GUNS COULD BE IN THAT VICINITY? YES?...NO?

It now seems evident that the mishaps which have plagued American rockets are not due to any shortcomings in the missiles themselves, but to the Russians' use of a thoroughly unsportsmanlike device for destroying them in flight. Is it any wonder that Brassnucks, goaded beyond endurance, bursts out with . . .

and can any redblooded American fail to echo these sentiments?

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Has de Gaulle's Time Come?

MANY WALLS in Algerian towns are placarded with tricolor posters proclaiming defiantly: *"L'Algerie Francaise vivra francaise!"* It is quite likely that the new Algeria will continue "to live French" for yet a while. But if the yield-nothing die-hards in Algiers and Paris have their way, the question may be whether and for how long France herself can live French and republican. During the tenure of office of Guy Mollet and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Algerian policy was increasingly made in Paris. Under Felix Gaillard the government in Paris has let itself—through a mixture of bravado and cowardice—be put more and more at the mercy of the Residing Minister in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, and the generals around him.

Little is recognizably French in the mode of life prescribed for the Moslem Algerians (some nine-tenths of the total population) by Lacoste's cronies, the enormously rich and powerful Henri Borgeaud, Georges Blanchette, Laurent Schiaffino or even Jacques Soustelle's Union for the Salvation and the Renewal of French Algeria. Much that seems Algerian is plain in the proscriptions decreed for Frenchmen as well as Algerians in France by Gaillard's Minister of the Interior, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury. In Algeria a barrier of electrically charged steel has been set up by the army to cut off intercourse with Tunisia. In France, a civilian mechanism of thought control not only seizes newspapers in Paris and censors films but gets the Belgians to ban an American film for impugning the honor of a few French army officers in 1916. In Algeria torture is unashamedly used by some military officers, the police, the parachutists, the *Département de Sécurité Territoriale;* and the case of Djamila Bouhired suggests that the procedures of military justice have gone down to levels below that of the Dreyfus trial. In France opposition to the government's policies is being labelled defeatism and defeatism may soon be equated, officially or even legally, with treason; it seems that the slow steady job of dismantling the structure of civil liberties in France which has accompanied the 40 months of war in Algeria has become a rush wreckage job. So much so that all the Cardinals and Archbishops of France have joined in exhorting French leaders to avoid both in Algeria and France "excesses contrary to the natural right and to the laws of God." It is a sad comment on the Portugalization of France—and also a portent—that the most recent precedents for such a warning from the Church of Rome have been in the Latin American dictatorial regimes of Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba.

☆

Those who would yield nothing are talking big and loud. Gaillard is their willing prisoner. General Blanc, Inspector-General of the Army, with five stars, has said in the presence of a group of foreign diplomats that if Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba did not listen to reason, the army could put him into prison and take his country "back" within 24 hours. There is talk again of the creation of an "independent European state" in North Algeria, willing to accept foreign help —and not necessarily only France's—as the Panamanians once accepted the first Roosevelt's; and there is new talk of a military reconquest of Tunisia and Morocco. A National Front is in the making in the back rooms of the Palais Bourbon to hold Gaillard fast—as if he needed to be held—to his absolute refusal to bargain or barter about Algeria with Robert D. Murphy or anyone else. To help the morale of the army in Algeria— and not entirely coincidentally to divert attention from the scandal about the political bases of promotions of officers—Finance Minister Pierre Pflimlin has subordinated budget-balancing to getting 28,000 more men across the Mediterranean.

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In the present mood, anything—literally anything—is justified and proper, if it prevents further "retreat" and more "national humiliation." No matter if a step turns out to be a worse *gaffe* than the deposition of the Sultan of Morocco or the seizure of the plane carrying Ben Bella. The victory in 1918 was Pyrrhic, that in 1945 phony; what was real was 1940, Vichy, Syria, Lebanon, Indo-China, Tunisia, Morocco, Suez.

But the reality in Algeria is war. And that war which a few months ago was said, officially, to have been ended has in fact grown worse. The French bombing of a Tunisian village has made it international. And since not a cent of the $655 million Jean Monnet found for Gaillard in Washington can be used—at least directly—to pay for the war, an unpayable bill will soon be coming due. The formula is simple: if American dollars don't come, Gaillard must go. In a month or two or three, perhaps sooner, the most difficult and perhaps the most dangerous problem of succession in many a year will have to be faced.

The large clan of former Premiers and the even larger clan of former Ministers are already horse trading. Candidates are being groomed. Paul Reynaud and Edgar Faure, for example, have already chosen Rene Pleven. But will this be *the* crisis for which everyone has waited in France since the liberation, the one for which the old rules really will not apply? If that is so, the names to be considered are those of the two men totally different in every way except in their honesty, their courage, their passionate love of France, their profound dislike of a very large number of their countrymen: Pierre Mendès-France and Charles de Gaulle.

If Mendès-France were called, he would certainly be concerned with only two tasks—giving Algeria some kind of independence within a North African federal framework associated with the French Union, and carrying out constitutional reform. But it is hard to see President Coty calling him at all. If called, it is even harder to see him successfully

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vaulting the several hurdles between the investiture and the promulgation of laws. For, as François Mauriac has pointed out, quite soundly, calumny has killed the only French parliamentarian who could have saved the situation. The session of the National Assembly on February 11 during which the Poujadist ex-parachutist Le Pen bared the fangs of overt anti-Semitism is a warning.

The mood of a majority of the members of the Assembly is not very different from that of a majority of the kind of Frenchmen who might "go down into the street"—that is, the mob; and it must, with regret, be said that a majority of all French men and women do not seem to care very much about what happens in parliament, in the street, or even in Algeria, provided that no member of the family gets hurt in the flesh or in the purse. It is quite possible that if Mendès-France were called for preliminary consultation at the Elysee, there might be street disturbances which would make the bloody ones of February, 1934, seem like a tea party.

There are those who say that the coming crisis will provide de Gaulle with his last chance. Perhaps they are right, but Robert Murphy once remarked to me that his quarter of a century in close contact with France had taught him that in French politics there was never a last chance and a politician was never dead until he had been corporeally buried. De Gaulle probably would have to be provided, first, with a seat in the Assembly. He has long been outside active politics and he is too little a Boulanger to consent to mount an extra-legal horse which, in the appropriate language of the stable, had been bred by the neo-colonialism of the *ultras* out of a bastard daughter of Vichy.

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The fact of coming into power by the front door would not, of course, guarantee that de Gaulle might not become a dictator—the case of the second, the little Napoleon is a precedent. Nor would de Gaulle take over power in order to preside over the dismemberment of the French Union. He would certainly try to keep Algeria within the Union, if not by the absurd wish-fulfilling fiction that it *is* French, then by some bond of intimate Commonwealth-like association. His personal honesty and integrity are beyond question. His prestige has survived serious trials. Unlike Gaillard, he would not be the head of a body moved by the wagging of a tail; neither Lacoste nor any other subordinate would dictate policy.

There is the risk that he might, in the words of Mussolini, turn the Assembly into a gray bivouac, but more chance that he could let it live and use his legal rights and privileges alone as a guide of it or check upon it. *Speriamo bene!* Certainly no other man in France, including Marshal Juin, could keep the generals tightly within the chain of command as he could. His conception of a Presidential system and of the role of the executive in it undoubtedly is authoritarian, but the man is no Fascist by any customary definition of the word and the alternate to him might well be just that. He might not even be republican, but those Frenchmen who still care may soon be in the position of beggars who cannot be choosers.

PERCY WINNER

Solution for Germany?—II

The Soviet Stake in A Divided Germany

Bonn

THREE groups in West Germany today not only reject Chancellor Adenauer's unbending commitment to the West but are ready to consider the only practical alternative—the prospect that sooner or later the East-West, all-German talks desired by the Russians may have to take place.

The first group centers on Dr. Gustav Heinemann, eight years ago Dr. Adenauer's first Federal Minister of the Interior and today a recruit to the Social Democratic "fraction" in the Bundestag. Heinemann does not like the East German marionette-team under Walter Ulbricht. But he recognizes the fact that they cannot be ignored so long as they have full Soviet backing.

The second group consists of the opportunistic right-wingers of the Free Democratic Party led by Wolfgang Doering. Supremely anxious to break the East-West deadlock, the Free Democrats have already tried to find their own route to reunification—through talks with the puppet East German "Liberal Democratic Party." A year ago the talks were broken off when the Free Democrats found that their so-called liberal counterparts were entirely at the beck and call of the Socialist Unity Party and Walter Ulbricht. The Free Democrats are now ready to try again but this time they are prepared to go further. All-German talks, they argue, do not necessarily imply full recognition of the undemocratic East German regime. They would merely give that regime a "de facto" recognition with the purpose of ending its separate existence as soon as reunification took place.

The third group is less easily defined. It consists of political independents who no longer have any patience for Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. One newspaper editor told me that there could be only one answer to a straight choice between reunification and an "exposed" political position, on the one hand, and security but the continuing division of Germany on the other. Security was desirable, but reunification was Germany's overriding vital objective.

This group of political independents has its chief mouthpiece in the newspaper, *Die Welt*. The owner of the paper, Axel Springer, has just been to Moscow to sound out Soviet suggestions of a willingness to compromise. He was accompanied by the paper's editor, Hans Zehrer, who was paying his second visit to Moscow. *Die Welt's* chief editorial writer, Paul Sethe, completes a triumvirate anxious at all costs to secure some political movement and to escape from the backwater of the

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correspondence-without-end between the US and Soviet heads of state. *Die Welt's* alteration of attitude is comparatively recent. On December 16 the paper utterly rejected talks with the Ulbricht regime; on February 10 it called for recognition of the fact that, that regime was firmly in the saddle and a solid factor in Central Europe. The change of emphasis was significant.

East German attitudes are never as easy to analyze as West German. It is helpful, therefore, that Walter Ulbricht has just given an interview to the Munich paper *Suedeutsche Zeitung* in which he outlines his own policy toward German reunification and shows how little it has changed in the last six months. In this interview Ulbricht repeated the Soviet demand for a "German Confederation" of two equally entitled German states. This Confederation would be brought into existence by a treaty between the two. An "All-German Council" would be created and would prepare further steps toward integration "after one or two years." Each German state would have 50 percent of the votes in the Council "so that there would be no danger of Germany's future being decided by a bare majority of a single vote." Western Germany would not necessarily have to embrace all the social reforms which have been carried out in Eastern Germany (land reform, the nationalization of industry and sections of agriculture, the establishment of monolithic trade unions and youth organizations). But democracy would have to "be restored and consolidated" in Western Germany. All-German elections could take place some years from now—after a new electoral system more akin to that of Eastern Germany (single-list candidates, and no political opposition) had been introduced for the whole of Germany.

ALL sorts of arguments could be employed to offset the sense of hopelessness engendered by Ulbricht's evident intractability. Perhaps, it could be said, he is stating "maximum terms" which are capable of revision. But the fact is that he has only restated the thesis advanced by Khrushchev to the East German Volkskammer last August. Perhaps he will be unable to maintain his unpopular regime in power. But Ulbricht has only recently carried out a bloodless purge of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party—which, far more than the Volkskammer, is Eastern Germany's governing body. Or perhaps Ulbricht might be discarded by the Russians if they forsaw sufficient gain in doing so. Here one comes back to the essential fact that the German question is dominated by Soviet policy and Soviet aims. For without Soviet backing the Ulbricht regime could be swept out of existence tomorrow.

For the last 12 years there have been two Soviet policies in Germany, policies which have sometimes gone hand in hand, sometimes run counter to one another. One policy has been guided by the desire to hold on to every inch of territory won in Central Europe and to consolidate gains prior to making a fresh advance to the West. The other policy has been to examine the possibilities of the "big victory" in Germany which would bring the mighty industrial strength of the Ruhr and the immense technical abilities of the West Germans within the Soviet orbit. If the first policy has been the more generally followed, it must surely be because of the political, economic and strategic importance of Eastern Germany to the whole satellite bloc. Were Eastern Germany to drift into the West European orbit, Poland would take another step away from Moscow, the Czechs would forget their gratitude to Russia for keeping Germany divided and impotent and Hungary would become even more difficult to hold down than at present.

Are there any real prospects for a change of Russian policy? In his "open letter" to the *New Statesman and Nation* Lord Bertrand Russell suggested the sort of proposals which he believed could induce such a change, including a neutralized zone in Central Europe, the establishment of a form of government in each country acceptable to its people and the acceptance of existing geographical frontiers, especially the Oder-Neisse Line.

Yet Lord Russell makes a solution of the German question sound much more simple than is in fact the case. The Soviet Union is prepared at present to allow a "nuclear neutralization" of Central Europe. Would it, however, allow a real "political neutralization"—implying, inevitably, the disintegration of the satellite bloc? The Soviet Union will allow a "German Confederation." Would it, however, really give Germany "a form of government acceptable to its people?" And just how would "East and West Germany unite with whatever form of constitution they prefer"? The Constitution will be largely chosen by Ulbricht and Khrushchev—that is their declared intention. It is very doubtful whether German reunification, on their terms, is preferable to the existing division and the strains which it causes.

The plain fact is that the terms for reunification so far offered by the Soviet Union — through Ulbricht and Grotewohl—are utterly unacceptable to the West German Government and West German electorate. There is no reason why these terms should not be discussed in a "conference at the Summit." Discussion might conceivably help to identify where there might someday be Soviet concessions. At present the only alternatives before the German people are absolute division, which exists at present, or a modified division in which the two German states would continue their separate existence and their union would be conditional on the achievement of Russian designs. This is a bleak reality which cannot be charmed away by the hypotheses of Lord Russell and George Kennan. The only hopeful prospect for a solution of the German problem still lies in a global settlement.

TERENCE PRITTIE

Second of two articles.

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The Superficial Aspect

The "Inability" Pact

THE Constitution of the United States does not provide that the Vice President shall in any circumstances become President, but he does, when the Presidential office is vacated by death. Seven times a Vice President has become President, not by authority of the Constitution, but by authority of John Tyler, who said it should be so, and it was so.

When William Henry Harrison died 30 days after his inauguration in 1841, Tyler assumed, not only the duties of the office, as the Constitution directs, but also the office itself, as the Constitution does not direct. From the start he signed official documents "President" not "Acting President," and since there was nobody in Washington with both the strength and the guts to stop him, he got away with it, and definitely established the succession in case of death.

Tyler simply occupied a power vacuum left by a lazy and indifferent Congress. But he filled it, and it has remained filled. President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon have now opened the way to imitate him in case the Presidential office is vacated, not by death, nor by impeachment, but by what the Constitution vaguely calls "inability." Their scheme is a makeshift and, as such, open to certain objections, but they deserve credit for acting when a bumbling and ineffective Legislative would not act, even when invited to do so, and a haughty Judiciary repudiates responsibility.

The weakness of the Eisenhower-Nixon compact is that it necessarily ignores elementary psychopathology. When a man suffers what the doctors delicately call "a cerebral accident" and laymen bluntly term a paralytic stroke, some alteration of personality nearly always follows, and usually the mental faculty first and most seriously impaired is that of judgment. As a rule, the patient is the last man to understand the full significance of his condition. Yet the compact assumes that when the President's mental capacity is seriously impaired he will know it and will remove himself from office. This is very seldom the case; yet what else could the two men do?

In case of incapacity that is total and obvious the compact lays upon the Vice President the responsibility of assuming the office on his own motion, which is unfair to the Vice President. Nobody thinks he should take over whenever the President has a cold in the head, or even if he should break a leg. But Garfield lingered for eleven weeks before dying of his wound, and exactly on what date should Thomas R. Marshall have taken over from Woodrow Wilson? A President of the United States should not be superseded on any one man's initiative, nor without the knowledge and consent of the Legislative and the Judiciary.

But if the Legislative and the Judiciary will not accept, or even acknowledge their responsibility, the Executive must make the best arrangement it can. If it had no other merit, the action of Messrs. Eisenhower and Nixon ought to bring sharp public criticism of the other branches' slothful neglect.

For it is no hypothetical danger that the existing situation presents. The solidarity of the United States Government is based upon recognition by each of the three coordinate branches of the legitimacy of the other two. In 1877 we were brought to the verge of civil war because a large segment of the population did not believe that the man in the White House had a legal right to be there; but the turmoil was quelled when the Legislative and the Judiciary both accepted him.

Six additional precedents have now confirmed Tyler's decision that the Vice President shall succeed when the Presidency is vacated by death. There is no question about his succession when it is vacated by impeachment or resignation. But death, impeachment and resignation are unquestionable, while "inability" is open to controversy, although we know that the possibility is ever-present.

THEREFORE each of the three coordinate branches ought to be committed in advance to a definite procedure, in which all three shall participate, to prove the fact of inability. The two officers who should be excluded from participation are the President and the Vice President, for the same reason that an honorable judge recuses himself when the case is one in which he has a personal interest. It is not that he is incapable of rendering a just judgment in such a case, but to protect the dignity of the bench from slurs and innuendoes.

The Presidency is entitled to equal protection. When, and if Mr. Nixon is to succeed Mr. Eisenhower is not a matter to be determined by Mr. Eisenhower, by Mr. Nixon, or by the Executive branch alone. It must be the joint decision of all three branches if the legitimacy of the Executive is to be sustained; and if it is not sustained, we shall go the way of the dictator-ruled states.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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"DISENGAGEMENT" in Central Europe as an alternative to the Iron Curtain is a hope almost as old as the Curtain itself. But when George F. Kennan made his proposal for a mutual withdrawal of Soviet forces behind Soviet frontiers and US forces from Europe he converted a hope into a subject of serious international discussion. Mr. Kennan's proposal was followed in December by the so-called "Rapacki Plan" in which the Polish Foreign Minister asked that all nuclear weapons be banned from East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the great debate which began with Mr. Kennan's Reith lectures over BBC, the voice of DENIS HEALEY, Member of Parliament and former secretary of the British Labour Party's International Department, has been one of the most influential on Mr. Kennan's side. Moreover, Mr. Healey has gone beyond Mr. Kennan; in *A Neutral Belt in Europe?*, published last month by the Fabian Society, he initiated a running rebuttal to the case *against* disengagement.

In three articles written for *The New Republic* Mr. Healey will now state his thesis in detail with specific reference to the possibility of Summit talks. His following articles will consider "A Model Plan for Disengagement" and "How To Start Disengagement."

The Case for Disengagement

by DENIS HEALEY

NOT SO long ago the main lines of Western policy in the Cold War seemed to be settled for at least a generation ahead. The entry of Western Germany into NATO completed a pattern which appeared to offer the Atlantic alliance political stability and military security for years to come—and these benefits were generally felt to compensate for the inadequacies of a status quo which meant leaving half of Europe and a third of Germany indefinitely under Soviet domination. Indeed there were many, not all outside Germany, who believed that the division of Germany between two power blocs might be the best guarantee of peace in Europe.

The confrontation of American and Soviet troops along a common frontier was seen as the best possible protection against war. People believed that world peace depended on the balance of mutual terror, that the threat of massive retaliation was the most effective deterrent against aggression, and that this threat would be convincing only if the powers which had the capacity for massive retaliation were certain to be involved directly and immediately by any violation of the status quo.

It is now becoming clear that this line of reasoning rests on certain unconscious assumptions and that those assumptions are demonstrably false. The policy of deterrence by the threat of massive retaliation assumes that the only danger of war lies in a deliberate act of military aggression by the Soviet Government—and that the Soviet Government will calculate the consequences of its actions both rationally and accurately. In 1956 Suez and Hungary blew this assumption sky high.

At Suez three non-Communist governments—two of them actually allied with the United States—started a local war without American agreement in an area of vital interest to both America and Russia. A combination of pressure by the two great powers with pressure by public opinion throughout the world brought the war to a halt in time. Mankind might not be so fortunate if fighting breaks out in the Middle East again.

In Hungary ordinary men and women took up arms to overthrow a government which had Soviet support.

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The Western powers stood by motionless in guilt and shame as the Russian tanks moved in to crush the rising. When the NATO Council met for the first time after the Hungarian tragedy the West German Foreign Minister asked his colleagues a question which none of them could answer: "What will NATO do if there is another rising in East Germany?" The fact is that no one can possibly know what would happen in such a situation until it comes about. In other words, world war can now arise as easily from a local conflict which starts without Russia's knowledge or support as from a deliberate act of Soviet aggression. Neither Russia nor America has sufficient control over events on its own side of the Iron Curtain to rule out the possibility of such a local conflict.

The second false assumption underlying current Western policy in Europe is that America will respond by massive thermonuclear retaliation to any major Soviet attack. The fact is that the certainty of American retaliation has been dwindling ever since Russia started building the capacity to respond in kind with thermonuclear attack on the United States. In October, 1957—even before the Sputnik—Mr. Dulles hopefully suggested that defense by limited atomic warfare should be substituted for retaliation in all-out thermonuclear war. In February, 1958, the Pentagon's frosty reception of the British Defense Minister's attempt to tie NATO to the old doctrine underlined the new trend of American policy.

AMERICA is obviously moving toward a more balanced strategy which admits the possibility of limited war —even perhaps in the nuclear field. But it looks as if her conversion may have come too late to win the consent of her European allies. The immediate reaction of the Continental countries to the suggestion of limited nuclear defense was totally negative. They argued that any attempt to distinguish between little wars and big wars was incompatible with the very principle of allied unity. They see the new trend as an attempt to spare America horrors which she is quite prepared to see inflicted on her allies. And indeed the only exercises so far held in limited atomic war involved destruction which for the countries in the battle area was indistinguishable from the ultimate thermonuclear holocaust. In Exercise "Carte Blanche" 300 Hiroshima-type weapons were exploded on the territory of Western Germany, causing an estimated five million casualties. Exercise "Sage Brush," held later in the US, involved the destruction of all life in the state of Louisiana.

Thus, as America grows more reluctant to commit suicide for the sake of her allies overseas, those allies are demanding the right to initiate massive retaliation for themselves, rather than experiment with the dubious refinements of limited atomic war. Britain has already achieved the capacity for thermonuclear attack on Russia. America's demand for intermediate range missile bases in Europe has played into the hands of other powers who want to follow suit. In any case it is only a matter of time before several more of America's European allies make atomic weapons for themselves—France hopes to explode her first nuclear bomb this year. But as the power to start race suicide spreads to an even larger number of the allies, ever nearer to the line where fighting may break out, membership in the alliance will involve a multiplication of risk out of all proportion to the increase in security. The danger that local conflict may lead to global nuclear war will be enormously increased. Both small and large countries may then seek safety in isolation or neutrality.

Meanwhile the disintegration of allied unity west of the Iron Curtain is paralleled by the decay of Communism as a unifying factor in the Soviet camp. This decay began with Yugoslavia's secession from the Cominform in 1948 and was much encouraged by the independent victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949. But it was the consequences of Stalin's death which set the process moving really fast in Eastern Europe. By dismantling Beria's secret police empire Khrushchev removed the most important physical instrument by which Russia maintained control of foreign Communist Parties east of the Iron Curtain. Even more decisive was Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution the loyalty of foreign Communists to Moscow has depended on the doctrine that the Kremlin can never be wrong. Khrushchev's speech was an ex-cathedra denunciation of the Kremlin's infallibility. It knocked the linch-pin out of international Communism as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy—with immediate consequences throughout the world.

It is now clear that Soviet control of Eastern Europe depends on the presence there of the Red Army. If the Red Army were withdrawn, all the satellite countries would rapidly evolve toward greater national independence and more political liberty—though for various reasons most of them would remain friendly to the Soviet Union and would retain many of the economic and social characteristics of a Communist society. On the other hand, if the Red Army remains in occupation, the danger of a violent explosion like that in Hungary will steadily increase, and the Western powers may next time be dragged into the fighting whether they like it or not.

Yet it is inconceivable that Russia should withdraw her troops from any part of Eastern Europe unless the West makes reciprocal withdrawals on its side, and a detailed agreement is reached between East and West on the diplomatic and military status of the area thus exposed. At present the NATO powers are so wedded to the concept of defending Western Europe by means of a tripwire along the Iron Curtain to trigger off massive retaliation that they will not consider withdrawing in return for similar withdrawals on the Soviet side. In

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consequence official Western policy on Eastern Europe has undergone a dramatic change. The most extreme anti-Communist crusaders are now preaching resignation instead of revolt. The slogan now is submission, not liberation—for above all the West fears a repetition of the Hungarian tragedy.

The nature of the Western *volte-face* was well illustrated by a report by the Berlin correspondent of the *London Times* on February 11 concerning Ulbricht's latest purge of the East German Communist Party. "It is difficult to resist the conclusion," he wrote,

> that Western Europe is indebted to Herr Ulbricht. . . . The Poles may safely be allowed a little license, but the East Germans never. In his firm rule over what must be regarded as a Soviet forward military area, Herr Ulbricht has probably prevented a conflagration that could commit and envelop West Germany.

Apart from the cynicism of such a position, it is impossible to believe that the West Germans will accept its implications much longer, whatever NATO allies desire.

The status quo in Central Europe has always been morally intolerable. It is now revealed as politically most unstable and full of appalling military dangers. Yet to reverse it by negotiation between East and West means a revolution in the military and political posture of both sides for which there is no precedent. If the pressures for such an agreement were limited to European factors alone, optimism would be difficult to justify. But there are more powerful factors operating on both Russia and the West to encourage an attempt at cooperation at least in a few major areas of disagreement.

If the Cold War continues much longer as an all-out struggle in every field of policy, both sides will face economic ruin and political collapse. The soaring cost of the weapons race at a time of rapid technological change threatens even the richest countries with bankruptcy. Yet, however great its expenditure on arms, neither side can expect so decisive an advantage over the other, that it can enjoy lasting security. Moreover the new weapons are so destructive that their employment means suicide for the user no less than his victim. Thus, increased military strength at the level of all-out war brings no advantage even in political influence. The threat of suicide cannot be used to support peacetime diplomacy.

The one comfort in the present situation is the feeling that peace may be maintained indefinitely by a balance of mutual terror. But this assumes that there are only two or three weights in the balance. As nuclear weapons become available to a wider and wider range of governments, it will become ever more difficult to maintain the equilibrium—particularly as some governments may be far less responsible and far less satisfied with the status quo than are those which possess nuclear weapons at the moment. Thus, for the first time in history, the great powers are beginning to show a genuine interest in disarmament. There is no reason to doubt the British Government's sincerity when it opened its Defense White Paper this year with a long section on disarmament.

It is impossible to limit arms in any field without agreement between both sides in the Cold War. Inside NATO, for example, America and Britain cannot deny their more exposed allies the weapons on which they rely themselves. The breakdown of the Tripartite Agreement on controlling arms deliveries to Israel and her Arab neighbors showed that it is impossible for the Western powers to limit the armaments of even little neutral countries unless Russia is prepared to cooperate. Yet so far, all attempts to get agreement between Russia and the West on comprehensive global measures of disarmament have broken down on the question of inspection and control. Indeed it is difficult to believe that either America or Russia would allow the other's spies into its atomic arms factories until it had been convinced by experience that this type of mutual control was certain to be effective. After all, America will not allow even her most trusted allies access to these secrets at the present time.

It is now clear that disarmament can start only with a pilot scheme in the limitation, inspection and control of armaments in an area which is not vital to either America or Russia, and where the two sides have a common interest in cooperation rather than in conflict. Moreover the countries submitted to international control in such a pilot scheme must receive some special benefits in return or they are unlikely to accept the discrimination against them which it entails.

There is only one part of the world where these necessary conditions for a regional pilot scheme in arms limitation already exist—namely Central Europe. It is an area which, with the development of long-range atomic striking power, is no longer indispensable to the security of either America or Russia. It is an area where the instability of the present status quo threatens a violent explosion which might involve the great powers against their will. Finally, all the countries likely to be involved in such a scheme in Central Europe could expect great political benefits in return for the resulting limitations on their military and diplomatic freedom. Germany would receive national unity; the satellite states would obtain the chance of greater political and national liberty.

The conception of military disengagement in Central Europe has steadily been winning support in all countries and all sections of political opinion in the last 12 months. If adopted, it would involve a revolution in the Cold War. The great powers would have to start seeking security in cooperation rather than conflict. It could be a turning point in the long history of mankind's search for peace. I believe it is by far the most hopeful issue on which to concentrate at Summit talks. But precisely because its long-term implications are so revolutionary both sides will be extremely cautious in committing themselves in principle to this conception.

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In Reply to Sumner Slichter

HOW LONG WILL THE

[Two weeks ago in our pages, Prof. Sumner Slichter explained why he still believes, as he wrote last November, that the US economy will begin to expand again by May at the latest. *The NR* invited five respected authorities to comment briefly on his prediction. Their views follow:]

I AM somewhat surprised that Professor Slichter, who was obviously over-optimistic in his November *New Republic* article, should persist in that optimism in the face of the unemployment, production and investment figures which we have in March.

He minimizes the dangers of the present serious recession because the major declines have been in employment, production and investment, while wholesale and retail trade, government, services and miscellaneous employment have held firm. But this is the very reason why the present recession is potentially much more dangerous than those of 1948-49 and 1953-54. Those were essentially "inventory" recessions. This recession has all the appearances of also being a classical capital goods or investment recession. We do not have much investment for long-term growth but we do have more investment and production than there is demand for the products of industry at present prices.

Consequently, the real danger at the moment is that of a cumulative break-down in the economy. I am not predicting that this will happen but when unemployment exceeds 8 percent—as the full-time equivalent of the unemployed and partly employed now does—and when production and investment indicators have fallen as they have, then such a breakdown is always possible.

Further, economic breakdowns do not proceed in some natural and orderly way. This is true even though the followers of equilibrium theory tend to believe that a decline in one economic sector can always be neatly counterbalanced by an equivalent increase in some sectors, *e.g.,* Professor Slichter's statement that, "the contraction will cease when the decrease in the remaining forms of gross private investment—outlays on industrial plant and equipment and on inventories—no longer exceed increases in government spending and housing."

The fact is that when unemployment, production and investment figures are at such levels as they are now, economic forces are more likely to be impetuous than orderly. At some point like that at which we now stand, the forces of breakdown can snowball and avalanche. Production, employment, purchasing power and investment all decline and each decrease leads to further decreases. Therefore, the danger is not that we will do too much or act too soon but that we will do too little and do it too late.

The quickest and most effective way to act is by means of a tax cut primarily designed for lower- and middle-income groups, *i.e.,* those groups which tend to spend almost all of their income. Such a tax cut would be fed into the economy almost immediately; it would stimulate demand for goods and services; afford the best hope for stopping the current economic recession and help to start an economic upturn. The increase in the demand for consumers' goods should also stimulate the demand for, and investment in, capital goods.

I am also surprised at Professor Slichter's view that it would be difficult to devise a tax cut that would take effect within the next two months and which would not be extremely arbitrary in its effect. I have already proposed that we tax the first $1,000 of taxable income at 15 percent rather than 20 percent. This proposal could go into effect immediately and could be made retroactive to January 1, 1958. Further, such a cut should expire on January 1, 1959, so that if the recession is stopped, the loss of revenue—which is proper in a recession—could be recouped during a prosperous period. Such a tax cut would pump some $3 billion per year into the economy.

In addition, I have proposed that the excise taxes on consumer durables, such as radios, television sets, refrigerators, air-conditioners, gas and oil appliances, luggage, handbags and wallets, be repealed; that the excise taxes on the transportation of property and persons and on communications be cut in half; and, if the automobile industry will agree to pass along such a cut in lowered prices, a 50 percent reduction in the manufacturer's excise tax on passenger automobiles. The total revenue losses in the excise repeals cuts which I have recommended are in the neighborhood of $1.4 billion.

The personal income tax cuts would show up in the weekly paychecks of individuals within a week or two following Congressional passage, and the excise tax cuts would bring a reduction in the prices of consumer dur-

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RECESSION LAST?

ables for which demand has declined.

A tax cut is therefore the quickest and best way to proceed. If we do that now, it may be unnecessary to spend billions on public works later, but if we rely on public works or monetary policy as the major antidote to a recession, we may well find that a few months from now we may need a tax cut of gigantic proportions to stop a decline.

While for both economic and social reasons I favor increased appropriations for schools, hospitals, slum clearance and highways, the question of whether or not the recession turns into a depression will have been decided before the economic effects of these measures can be felt. It is for this reason, in particular, that a tax cut is necessary now.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS
Washington, D. C. *U. S. Senator from Illinois*

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PROFESSOR SLICHTER places great emphasis on the prospect that increased housing starts will regenerate economic growth. Yet census figures and projections indicate that new household formations dropped from a high of 1.5 million during 1947-51 to 833,000 in 1955 and they are expected to continue to drop to about 600,000 by 1960. Household formations cannot be expected to increase again until the crop of postwar children is ready for marriage—about 1965. We must depend for new household formations upon the children of the 30's and early 40's when the birth rate reached the lowest point in the history of the country!

Moreover, Professor Slichter appears unconcerned about the tremendous debt assumed by American households for homes, furniture, appliances and automobiles. Short-term consumers credit rose from $5 billion in 1945 to $45 billion by 1952—mostly on automobiles. Housing mortgages rose from $18 billion in 1945 to $107 billion in 1957. Such credit expansion provided a strong but non-recurrent boost to the boom. This debt burden now hangs over the American economy as a powerful potential decelerating factor in the event that incomes start to level off or decline.

The high rate of business investment in plant and equipment during the past few years was also largely predicated upon these expanding consumer expenditures generated by the rapid rate of new family formation and expansion of consumer credit. Since these two forces which have generated and regenerated our prosperity during the past 10 years cannot any longer be counted on it is difficult to see how business investment in capital plant and equipment can quickly revive.

MATTHEW J. KUST
Washington, D. C. *Attorney At Law*

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SUMNER SLICHTER takes it as a "fact [sic!] that Congress will wisely insist on spending more on defense, education, conquest of space, natural resource development and compensation of government employees than the President recommended" but will refuse to make cuts in other programs. If Slichter is right in this political prognostication and if these Congressional decisions will be implemented promptly, then I agree with his conclusion that the recession will not last long. However, some economists (the present writer included) would make a more pessimistic forecast if the question were asked: what is the likely economic outlook assuming that only the President's recommendations in the Budget and the Economic Report are adopted? These forecasts would indicate the need for larger programs of the type assumed by Slichter. This was one of the questions which concerned the Joint Economic Committee and which was reflected in the Committee's Joint Economic Report issued last week. Thus, it appears to me that Slichter's views are less startling and not so different from the views expressed by other economists. They differ only from the views of those few who believe that the recession will be very serious and prolonged irrespective of what the government will be doing.

Slichter also writes that changes in the sum of government outlays and private investments determine changes in personal incomes and consumer spending. This appears to me as an oversimplification. I do not think that changes in consumer attitudes, particularly in the purchase of durable goods, can be neglected in the analysis of the present situation. An adequate government program would be effective not only by supporting the payment of wages and other incomes but also by

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reducing the economic uncertainty which now unfavorably affects consumer and business buying. Therefore, such a program could have an "announcement" effect even before the actual increase in spending is under way.

A forecast which assumes as a "fact" that an adequate government program will be adopted but does not state what the outlook would be in the absence of such a program, may lead to the misinterpretation that the recession is virtually over and that therefore no program is really needed at all.

GERHARD COLM
Chief Economist
Washington, D. C. *National Planning Assn.*

☆

IN SUPPORT of his prediction of last November that "the present decline in business will be shorter and milder than the contraction of 1953-54," Professor Slichter now offers an analysis that seems deficient on two scores: insufficient account is taken of expenditure plans and some important factors are neglected.

With respect to plans, the November-December Michigan survey of consumer buying intentions and outlook showed the most gloomy expectations in 5 years, even among the higher-income consumers, and the surveys of planned business expenditures for plant and equipment have forecast a marked downward shift. The consumer forecasts have since been confirmed by the sharp drop in new auto sales and a considerable reduction in department store sales, and the declines in the past 6 months in disposable personal income and in security prices will depress spending over the near future.

As for the neglected factors, they include the reduced liquidity of business firms, the large and widespread excess of industrial capacity built up in the recent investment boom, the continued decline in our exports in the past year, more unfavorable international conditions than prevailed in 1953-54, and a slump in business confidence in the Eisenhower leadership so that "chins-up" pronouncements are followed by declines in stock prices.

Professor Slichter's rather optimistic prognosis not only rests on somewhat questionable analysis but, in part, on hopes that Congress "will wisely insist on spending more" on constructive programs than the President has recommended and that the Federal Reserve authorities will engage in an "aggressive easing of credit."

What is needed, however, is a definite program for action that will restore confidence by indicating a determination to take specific steps over the next few months, including measures unmentioned by Slichter such as the Kennedy-McCarthy bill to provide decent benefits for the jobless. Such a program should not be hampered by worries about the consumer price index, which suffers from temporary developments like the weather and has a short-run upward bias now because of various lags.

RICHARD A. LESTER
Princeton, N. J. *Professor of Economics*

☆

SUMNER SLICHTER discusses the decrease in outlays on industrial plant and equipment and on inventories and concludes that "the balance of the economy will shift from contraction to slow expansion about the time that disinvestment in inventories begins to fall—about March at the earliest and May at the latest." This statement implicitly predicts consumer expenditures.

Discretionary consumer expenditures, such as those on durable goods, are a function both of financial means (income, assets minus debts), representing ability to buy, and of underlying attitudes, representing willingness to buy. Income and assets are still relatively satisfactory but consumer sentiment began to deteriorate quite a while ago, before the onset of reduction in business inventories. Following its June, 1957, survey of consumers the Survey Research Center reported that "consumer optimism is weakening." According to the Center's December, 1957, survey, "Concern about the business outlook as well as about their personal financial situation has grown during the past six months among American consumers. A substantial proportion of the American people heard unfavorable economic news of late. This information has given rise to worries and feelings of uncertainty and lowered consumers' inclinations to purchase houses and automobiles."

The survey findings point to a fairly lengthy depression, though not to a severe one, unless something is done soon to improve both consumer buying power and consumer sentiment. Consumer inclinations to buy may revive if inflation could be arrested through widespread discounts, "sales" and opportunities for good buys. Even if this does not happen, feelings of uncertainty and pessimism may wear off slowly if, in due time, it is realized that the fears of really bad times have been unwarranted. Is it necessary to wait that long and risk that the recession deepens in the meantime? The government has acted already through easing money rates and increasing defense expenditures. An analysis of how consumers think, presented in a report entitled "Sign Posts to Turning Points," indicates that increased defense spending does not necessarily raise the confidence and optimism of consumers because reminders of war and of higher taxes, associated in people's thinking with armament efforts, are depressive factors. Domestic spending programs and tax reductions may have a quicker favorable impact on consumer sentiment.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Towerless Edifice —II

by Daniel Bell

IN LOOKING at a society or an epoch, what marks a work as great is either a new vision (such as Tocqueville's), a sense of tragedy (as Henry Adams' *Education*), or, failing these some new image of the inner unity of a civilization, that is, an answer to the crucial problem first posed by Montesquieu: how does this all hang together? Older moralists thought that God or chance ruled the world. (Descartes, as Isaiah Berlin reminds us, spoke of history "as a tissue of idle gossip and travelers' tales suitable only for whiling away an idle hour.") But for Montesquieu, the first sociologist, societies were not fortuitous collections of heterogeneous elements or artificial constructions, but natural growths which obtain a definable character out of "climate, religion, law, the maxims of government, the examples of past things, customs, manners; and from the combination of such influences a general spirit is produced."

America as a Civilization, by Max Lerner (Simon and Schuster; $10).

But each society combines these factors in different ways; each society has its own inner structure and "general spirit." What is that of America? Laski tried to narrow the problem by insisting on the tensions between the egalitarian aspirations of the masses and the power of the industrial oligarchy as the foundation for all other behavior; and the superstructure came toppling down upon him. Others—and Lerner lists twenty of the more serious efforts—have tried to capture the "uniqueness" of America in some distinctive aspect of our development: the lack of a feudal past, the refusal to accept authority, the multiplicity of ethnic groups, etc. The search is an endless one. One recent military historian, Trumbull Higgins, has argued that the divergences in American and British strategic concepts in World War II—the one favoring a single, crushing blow, the other a cautious encirclement from multiple points — are traceable to the Calvinist and Anglican temperaments of the two countries. A psychoanalyst, Allan Wheelis, sees a clue to changes in the American character in the "decline of the super-ego."

LIKE all of us, Lerner is trapped by sheer inability to capture a definition which will not fall apart on close analysis. One can see him, year after year, desperately mulling over the question, reading all the previous answers, spotlighting their deficiencies; yet, in the end, like a mountain climber unable to gain a foothold on the slippery rock face, he suddenly lets go, and says: "there is no single talisman to the secret of American civilization," there is no single organizing principle. "Causation" he says of the social sciences, "is giving way to relation and inter-action." For every yea, there is a nay. "The study of American civilization," Lerner concludes, "becomes thus the study of the polar pattern itself, not a search for some single key that will unlock causation."

In the end, then, Lerner is forced to say that analysis consists only of "an inter-play of the material world and the moral- psychological." And the result is, that while Lerner has talked bravely of America as a "civilization" — and defined the term as a "distinctively etched style of life, historically shaped and recognized by self and others as a new design for living"—the "interplay" dissolves all coherence. Read past the first two chapters, where Lerner grapples with the problem of identity; and you have a superb panorama of American life. One can't fault Lerner on any topic. He has read assiduously, asked humbly, and revised on the best criticism. His 88 columns of notes and almost 1500 references indicate the extraordinary range of his industry. One has here an encyclopedia of American life which will be, for years, the best single source on American mores, cultural life, or changes in property relations. But while there are many rooms in this mansion, there is no distinct architechtonic structure.

Lerner, in reaction against the deterministic efforts of his predecessors—and most likely Laski—wanted to emphasize the variety of life and complexity in America; but ends up by sacrificing theory and method for description. In hoping to apply the language of cultural anthropology to contemporary history, Lerner was, I think, seduced by the social sciences. The concepts of anthropology are "holistic," that is they seek to grasp the totality of a culture. But even the most successful attempts at understanding a primitive society, let alone a modern one, have foundered on the problem of description, and as with Ruth Benedict's descriptions of cultures as Apollonian or Dionysian, have had to resort to metaphors. The attempts to find causal chains, while always partial, can give us, perhaps, a better sense of the involved skein of society than the dissolution of causation into the "interplay of the material and moral-psychological worlds." And, while less ambitious, and perhaps even wrong, the efforts of a Louis Hertz or a Daniel Boorstin do seek at least an analytical thread on which to hang Montesquieu's fundamental question.

It may be that Lerner's book will be the last of such synoptic efforts to encompass the entire range of American experience, not only because that experience, and its documented materials, are becoming too vast to be treated by a single person, but that the rubric itself is at fault, that the ambiguity lies really in the term America, which is a cluster of many meanings. To ask: what is the "secret of America," is to pose a metaphysical question without a real purpose; for it is not a genuine question. The ones that are lie within what Robert Merton has called "the middle range," those that arise out of empirical investigation but permit some controlled generalization.

ONE AREA and one which will come into increasing prominence in future years, are the comparative questions. Why, for example, could McCarthyism flourish in the United States but not in Britain. Edward Shils, in his *Torment of*

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Secrecy has provided some answers: the different elite structures, and more, the tradition of civility in Britain, with its emphasis on privacy and social distance, in contrast to that of populism in the United States with its insistence on disclosure and levelling; an insistence, it might be pointed out, which, with its emphasis on "let the people know," also underlies our concept of the prying—or crusading—role of the press. But surely, in an age when the image of America becomes reflected against the other peoples of the world, no inquiry into the American character can neglect comparative questions.

A SECOND area is that, not of "interplay" but of the "functional" relationship of institutions, or, how behavior in one area is shaped by or grows out behavior in others. For example, Eric Erikson in his *Childhood and Society*, seeks to relate the family to the political structure. The American family, he says, in contrast to Europe, is not divided into unequal partners (adults over children; husbands over wives; older sibs over younger ones), but one in which each person has equal rights and where one gains privileges by making concessions. The American family is thus "a training ground in the toleration of different interests," and Erikson finds here a relation to the political system, a "rocking sea of checks and balances" in which "uncompromising absolutes must drown." Further, he sees in the emphasis in the family on doing what is less unacceptable to any one member, as against doing what they *all* want, a parallel to the operation of Congress where the thought that good legislation may fail to pass is less important than the fact that some legislation may pass which is markedly unacceptable to a major group, since it negatively affects their interest.

A third area of "controlled inspection" lies in tracing through the specific changes in institutions, or character structures, over time, and seeing not only in what ways they have changed but which other institutions have not changed, and why. The recent theories of change — from "inner-directed" to "other-directed" or from "protestant ethic to social ethic"—are too facile, for we are never told how, when or where such changes took place.

A fourth area lies in examining historical crises, and the choices which the country and its leaders made as against other alternatives. It is an existentialist truism that character defines itself in choice. If so, can we identify the crucial turning points in American history and understand what dictated the choices we made or failed to make (*e.g.*, the decision to intervene in Korea, the cowardice before McCarthy, the round-up of Nisei in World War II, etc.)?

These lines of inquiry may have less appeal than those which insist on seeing America in metaphorical and metaphysical terms; but unfortunately, the latter is the tendency which many of our American Studies programs, mesmerized by the notion of an American destiny, employ in their search for the meaning of American "uniqueness."

In June 1794, Coleridge met Southey at Oxford, and the two worked out the idea of a "pantisocracy," a term which Coleridge invented. This was, as I. A. Richards tells us, a noble and philosophic project for a utopian settlement in the beneficient atmosphere of America, an ideal community where twelve young men with their twelve wives were to conduct "an experiment in human Perfectibility." America has always held out such hopes; and somehow partially betrays them. The quest is ever for a community of superior equals. It is a measure of Lerner's scholarship that he has sought to create, within the confines of one volume, a pantisocracy. If he has not succeeded, it is still to his credit—and how many can claim that—that he tried.

This is the second section of a two-part essay.

Sputnik

NOT the first man but poet who visits the moon
Should be watched for. The man
Is not dangerous; he will stick
To his business of keeping well-fed and warm.
He will chip rock.
But the poet, alas, disguised as a newspaper pundit,
Will send back the first hyperboles, ending
The primary phase of space exploration and heralding
Soul.

What he will say in particular is not known
(He'll be Russian),
But the main current is clear; it will be lush
And southern,
Reminding us of the Rubaiyat, Rousseau,
Or lines from a seed catalogue, in which all
Those caverns measureless, forests dim,
Bottomless seas, and surmises in Darien
Will be measured, trekked, plumbed, surmised and writ up
Vividly, while below

Those of us, without tickets, who have assiduously
Tilled some plainer rhetoric and averred
That all in all the mind is a clod, not a bird,
Will be looked at with mounting amusement, until the moon men
Who read us in space ships and summer cottages
Perched on lunar volcanoes under the stars
Will observe that we down below sitting at typewriters
(Moon men will do it by thought waves in Basic Morse)
Are very eccentric, Gothic, *something* or other, having
The rich verbal manner, the lush Southern flavor of, well,
Rousseau perhaps, or the Rubaiyat, or lines
Out of a quaint old book by a man named Burpee.

REED WHITTEMORE

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A Masterpiece from Underground

by Patrick Dennis

DURING the past twenty years of widely publicized totalitarian bestiality, numberless victims of Nazi, Fascist and Communist regimes have been pointlessly thrown into jails and left there to rot for depressingly long periods. It is not surprising that many of these prisoners, finding plenty of time on their hands, whiled away their incarcerations by writing books. Nor is it surprising that the considerable number of these books to have found publishers—at least two a season for the past twenty years—have been very, very bad. However, owing to the circumstances of their authorship, no one has ever had the heart to say so.

Angry Harvest, by Herman Field and Stanislaw Mierzenski (Crowell; $5).

But the fact remains that the majority of such volumes have been whining, breast-beating memoirs, overflowing with accounts of suffering, protestations of innocence and hymns of praise to the Democratic Way of Life. And in many cases recent history has revealed that the authors deserved a good deal worse than imprisonment, semi-annual royalties and an autographing party at the Booke Nooke—for reasons *other* than literary.

Angry Harvest is a breathtaking departure from the general run of jail books. To begin with, it is a novel with no whisper of steel bars or self-pity between its covers. It was written in a Communist prison in Poland by two men, neither of whom happened to be a novelist and neither of whom spoke the other's language. Hermann Field is an American architect, Stanislaw Mierzenski a Polish journalist. Finding themselves in the same cell, the two men entertained one another over four years by whispering *Angry Harvest* in German while Field wrote it down in English.

That they were able to turn out anything even literate under such taxing circumstances is surprising. But what really stuns the sensibilities is that *Angry Harvest* is not only a spellbinder, but also a sizable work of art as writing. It is the kind of craftsmanlike book that few of our Great Novelists could achieve in eight years of uninterrupted work under the most comfortable of conditions.

SET in German occupied Poland during World War II, *Angry Harvest* is the story of Leon Wolny, a bachelor farmer who has worked his way steadily, ambitiously upward to becoming a well-to-do, middle class and *almost* genteel citizen. Leon considers himself a good Catholic, although he rarely misses a chance at a shady deal. He feels that he is patriotic while dabbling more and more in the black market and hoarding gold and greenbacks. (His brief alliance with the underground—for money—almost causes him to die of fear and actually does bring about another's death.) He is piously pleased to be the benefactor of the ruined noblewoman who was once his employer, although snobbery and greed are his motivations.

Into his life comes Rosa Kornblum, an attractive young Jewish medical student fleeing extermination by the Gestapo. Leon hides her in his house for a few days, feeling heroic and Christian about his good turn while also experiencing great compassion for the girl. The days stretch into weeks and gradually Leon falls in love with Rosa, begging her to become his mistress and—after the German defeat—his wife.

Eventually, but with reluctance, Rosa consents. She owes her life to Leon and she is, after all, safe and comfortable in his house. To his delight and her horror, their physical relationship begins. But once his desires have been thoroughly satisfied, Leon just as gradually falls out of love. Believing himself a devil with the ladies, lust moves Leon to consider the sluttish daughter of the richest villager and ambition and longings for gentility even cause him to contemplate marriage into the family where he was once a footman. Rosa is only Jewish and mixed marriages . . .

The outcome of the story is as horrifying and blood curdling as it is enthralling. It is, as they say in the book trade, a great yarn.

But even better than the story itself

NOT PEEP-HOLE JOURNALISM

I. F. Stone's Weekly is a Washington newsletter with no inside information to sell. It does not claim to have a crystal ball. It is not briefed by Secretary Dulles or Sherman Adams. It is not a vehicle for you-can-print-this-but-don't-quote-me misinformation, nor a conduit for the old Capitol game of using leaks to favored newsmen in intra-Administration vendetta.

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is the authors' genius for characterization. Leon is dreadful, of course, but he's not really a *bad* man. He is like other people, thinking always of himself, weak and self-delusive, making glib excuses for his most reprehensible acts. Nor is Rosa the virtuous little Jewish refugee so popular in wartime writing. She is riddled with human failings. Being a wordly, educated Warsaw girl, she finds Leon hopelessly cloddish, laughable in his pretensions and inadequate as a lover. When she comes to care for Leon it is not because of love, but because of the security he represents.

And, as with these two, every other character in *Angry Harvest* is a fully rounded, living, breathing person. Leon's servants (although they *will* insist on speaking a peasant dialect as irritating as it is probably authentic), the parish priest, the villagers, the ruined aristocrats, the local "big" businessmen—these are not the black and white stereotypes of popular fiction, but real, understandable human beings moving purposefully and inevitably through a truly great novel.

If the outrageous history of the particular prison book is true—and I still can't believe it—I can only say that the authors *may* have set out to write an entertainment for themselves, but they have produced a masterpiece for all of us.

Jefferson, Marx and Aquinas

by Carl Kaysen

We are all Jeffersonians, now that belief in Socialism is dead, and Messrs. Kelso and Adler hold up an image of Utopia that aims at a correspondingly wide appeal. Comes the Capitalist Revolution, we will all be capitalists: every or nearly every family will have a "capitalist estate" which will provide the greater part of its income; "subsistence labor," undertaken merely for gain, and not for its intrinsic worth, will become increasingly unimportant, and more and more people will devote their time to the "work of civilization," creative in quality and liberal in aim. Like the citizens of the *polis*, we will devote ourselves to the arts, religion, government; instead of slaves, we will own machines (or equities in them).

The Capitalist Manifesto, by Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler (Random House; $3.75).

The wide diffusion of property ownership, the independence of the propertied man as against the unpropertied worker, will make possible a truly classless democratic society, in which the basis of economic power (property) is as widely distributed as that of political power (suffrage). The authors' vision of the new order is offered not merely as an enticing possibility of improvement for an already comfortable society, but as the one path of hope open before us, as the inherent contradictions of welfare capitalism threaten to choke progress if we try to maintain liberty, or to push us to complete socialism if we try to maintain economic growth.

It is an attractive vision; is it a compelling one? Not to me, for the economic analysis on which it rests is utter nonsense. To be sure, an academic puts his head on the block when he criticizes a social thinker (how much worse a pair of them) from a narrow technical point of view. While we should expect the social critic and prophet to give us insight, not rigorous demonstrations of formal theorems, valid insight without some understanding of how the system functions is hardly possible. Messrs. Kelso and Adler set out to reform the economy, woefully ignorant of economics.

Both their criticisms of our present economic arrangements and their proposals for reform — their Manifesto — are grounded on the proposition that in our economic ills, and many of our social and political ones as well, arise from the combination of a "capitalistic" system of production with a "laboristic" system of distribution. Capital is responsible for a large and increasing share of production; labor, however, continues to get the bulk of the national income. The authors estimate that capital "produces" 90 percent of the national output, but labor gets 70 percent of the national income, while capital receives only 30 percent.

Because the ownership of capital in our society is highly concentrated, a natural or just distribution, which gave to the owners of capital 90 percent of the national output would be intolerable. Therefore the whole apparatus of welfare capitalism is required to restrict the income of owners of capital, and redistribute income to the propertyless majority of workers. The essential step in the Capitalist Revolution is limitation of the maximum capital holding of the individual family, and approach toward equality of ownership by various methods of redistribution. Once the redistribution was accomplished, the welfare state could be dismantled, unions would no longer need to operate to redistribute income from profits to wages, corporate taxation could be eliminated, and the removal of these and other obstacles to the further accumulation of capital would permit more rapid economic growth than we have experienced.

The authors never explain the sense in which capital "produces" 90 percent of our social output. Their discussion of this point is reminiscent of Marxist discussion of labor as the sole source of value. We might perhaps interpret them as arguing that, without any capital equipment, the output of the present labor force would be only 10 percent of what it is now, and therefore capital "produces" 90 percent of the total product. But it is equally true that without any labor, the existing stock of capital equipment would produce nothing, and therefore labor "produces" 100 percent of the total product. Marx at least had the advantage for his argument that he could claim that present capital was but "frozen" past labor (stolen from its rightful owners, the workers). It is a little harder to argue that present labor is liquefied (?) past capital, stolen from its rightful owners, the capitalists.

Another sense in which we might try to interpret the authors' view of the correct shares of labor and capital in the social product is that if it were for the interventions of the state, the exactions of unions, and the like, and if markets were free and competitive, wages and prices would be such that labor's share of the national income would be 10 percent and property owners' 90 percent, rather than the current 70-30 division.

But this is no more defensible a posi-

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tion. Labor markets are indeed imperfect, and labor unions contribute—though it is arguable how much—to that imperfection. But the markets in which business firms sell their products are at least as far from being free and competitive, and two, sets of imperfections tend to cancel each other as far as relations between labor and property incomes go. Further, the relative shares of labor and property incomes in the total have changed little over a long period of time.

In 1929, before unions in the United States had much strength and the Welfare State had been heard of, the shares were roughly 60-40, as they were two decades before. Further, much of the small change that has occurred is explained by the relative decline in the importance of agriculture and other unincorporated business, where property income tends to be higher relative to wages than in the corporate sector. Thus, within the group of all non-farm corporations, the share of wages in total income produced was just under 75 percent in 1929, and just over 76 percent in the period 1950-55.

THE AMOUNT of income redistribution which the authors impute to the combined activities of government and unions is heroic and literally unbelievable. The income redistribution in countries like France and England, where both union power and state intervention are advanced far beyond the domestic standard does not reach 10 percent of their respective national incomes; Messrs. Kelso and Adler tell us that it is 60 percent in the United States.

Without the keystone proposition that capital "produces" 90 percent of total output, the structure of the authors' argument crumbles, and little is left standing. Redistribution of the ownership of capital will not create a universal leisure class, whose incomes will depend on "subsistence labor" to only a minor extent.

No matter how rapid the progress of automation in the next several decades, and no matter how great a redistribution of property, most of us will still have to work for our incomes if we wish to continue to enjoy a growing standard of living, to say nothing of making a contribution to the accumulation of capital in the poorer 80 percent of the world. Inflation and instability can no longer be seen as the inevitable consequences of the redistribution of income from property owners to labor on a vast scale; the restoration of a "just" distribution by the Capitalist Revolution cannot confidently be expected to produce an automatic end to these problems.

The Manifesto is as unconvincing in detail as in grand idea. In order to vindicate the property rights of shareowners, the authors propose that corporations be required to pay out all their earnings in dividends, rather than the 50 or 60 percent they now do; and go to the market for capital needed for expansion. They also propose the abolition of corporate income taxation, which would make 100 percent distribution feasible. Aside from the economic merits or demerits of complete distribution of corporate earnings, it is hard to see how this alone would do much to change the general character of the relation between stockholder and management in the large corporation. And even with the added check of the capital market, the large corporation would still represent a significant center of economic power; yet the authors' discussion of how well this does or does not accord with their Jeffersonian model is brief and vague. Whether "property" in the sense of shareholdings in large corporate enterprises, no matter how widely distributed, is "property" in the sense of Locke is a question which does not appear to have even occurred to the authors, much less troubled them. Similarly, a set of distinctions between subsistence work and liberal work which appeared appropriate to the slave society of Greece may not be equally appropriate today. In a world where most men must do work which Aristotle would have despised, there is a great and largely unsolved problem of how to organize that work so that it does have a meaningful personal content to those who do it; this problem cannot be solved by wishing it away.

If the substance of *The Capitalist Manifesto* is a curious mixture of Jefferson (for political inspiration) and Marx (for economic reasoning), the language in which it is clothed is more the language of Aquinas. In the questions which the authors examine, Reason and Natural Law are their guides; principles of Justice, valid for any economy and any organization of society furnish the standards by which not only our but other economies can be judged. While the exposition is clear, vigorous, and readable in detail, this structure of thought seems to me to add little to the persuasiveness of the authors' arguments.

The authors are fundamentally wrong, and even wrong-headed in their method of attacking their problem; yet the book is stimulating and worth reading. Even a wrong-headed discussion of the important large problems of our society is better than no discussion, and the absorption in technical problems at the expense of any concern with broader issues is characteristic of most of the writings of my own academic fraternity.

MOVIES

New England Boiled Dinner

THE SUCCESS of the film *Peyton Place*, like that of the book, is based on the wholesome, staunch, popular morality that underlies it. In the novel this was obscured by the author's lapses in taste and her muscular strivings for candor. Publicity attached to the book because of incidents in the author's personal life and because the text was studded with frank sex language and episodes; but anyone experienced in publishing knows that neither one nor the other of these, though sometimes helpful, can of itself make a book successful. Otherwise, the second reason alone would jam the best-seller lists to bursting. There are always other reasons; and in the case of *Peyton Place*, the reason was its author's passion to expose the pseudo-respectable, born of and combined with the basic puritanism she shares with thousands of readers.

Peyton Place (20th Century-Fox).

The producer and the screenwriter of the film, Jerry Wald and John Michael Hayes, have recognized this. By choice or by necessity they have sheared off

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most of the pungent trappings of the book and were left with as unctuous a tract as ever sprang full-blown from the mind of Lloyd C. Douglas. Indeed, in an article in *Variety* Mr. Wald says that they found in the book "a hard core of moral truth" on which they constructed this film. The result is as unexceptionable and as universally appealing as milk chocolate.

THERE is usually something to be learned from immense success, and *Peyton Place* demonstrates the value of earnestness. The novel is no catchpenny affair; it is the work of a fifth-rate intellect, with talent to match, working at the very top of its bent with complete sincerity. Miss Metalious is in the direct line of the truth-tellers of New England from Hawthorne through Howells to O'Neill. She is rather far down the line but her motives are similar to theirs.

New England has always been full of lids to be ripped off in a way that, for example, the South has never been. Anyone can look at the South, particularly post-bellum, and see relatively quickly that its closets are well-stocked with skeletons. But New England looks so proper, so trim, the air is so heavy with a sense that God must approve the industry and virtue that He sees. For a hundred years any New Englander with an eye for discrepancies and an itch to write has found the streets paved with novels and plays ready to be picked up. Miss Metalious, because she was writing in the middle of our century, had wider license of vocabulary and detail than her forebears, a license which she evidently felt compelled to use and was not quite able to control; but fundamentally she is as severe as a beadle.

Because Hollywood was forced to eliminate her excesses, the film is better than the book. This often happens in cases where the rigors of dramatic form impose a tighter discipline on prolix material. It is especially likely to be true if the film is made from a piece of inferior writing. Where the author is able only to sketch a character, the imagination of a director and the presence of an actor can supply the rest. Where the author's powers of evocation are limited, the camera can fulfill. With a good writer, the camera often seems an intrusion of fact between us and truth; but read the first paragraph of this novel and look at the opening shot of the film and you will see how photography has completed Miss Metalious' plan.

The film in final effect is an overlong exercise in sentimentality with some telling touches about small-town life. As is common in Hollywood movies, the best moments are the incidentals: the details of the Labor Day picnic, the high school *gaucherie,* the camera's use of the physical detail of the town itself to create an emotional atmosphere. It is the important moments in the story and motivation and dialogue that are given Technicolor icing.

As a pair of high school friends Hope Lange and Diane Varsi are affecting personalities if not remarkable actresses. The best scenes in the picture are those between Miss Varsi and a youth named Russ Tamblyn which convey a nice feeling of innocent fellowship in the exploration of love. Lana Turner, who plays Miss Lange's mother, has at least one gift: she can walk into a real scene (much of this picture was shot in New England) and make it seem synthetic. Lee Philips, the high school principal, is pleasant-looking but sounds like Donald Duck. Experienced and interesting players like Lloyd Nolan, Arthur Kennedy, and Mildred Dunnock do their best to redress the balance.

A spicy piece of iconoclasm toned down somewhat for the screen? Nothing of the kind. *Peyton Place*, stripped of its seeming nudity, stands swathed in its Victorian petticoats. The good old Victorian cast of characters is complete: the kindly town doctor, the rebellious idealistic young teacher, the mother atoning for a youthful indiscretion, the rich wastrel who is redeemed by love, the girl from the wrong side of the tracks who defends her honor even unto the assailant's death, and the tremulous heroine who Writes.

They enact a story which articulates what an audience likes to hear: that the standards by which it thinks it lives are the best. When an audience watches the vindication of (presumably) its own virtues, when it sees the downfall of hypocrisy and the eventual triumph of that commonsense it recognizes in itself, a gentle purring seems to fill the theatre. And when that happens, how can a picture fail?

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

RECORDS

Mostly Singers

ON only two of her recent London records has Flagstad approximated her incandescent singing of Wagner's Wesendonck songs on 5259. One is 5277, with arias by Handel and Bach, in which, unfortunately, her lustrous-sounding and beautifully shaped phrases are heard in crude orchestral contexts provided by Boult with the London Philharmonic. The other is 5319, with songs of Brahms, a few of which — *Treue, Liebe, Am Sonntag Morgen, Wie Melodien zieht es, Wir wandelten* — are among the better Brahms products, but most of which, including the pretentious and dull *Vier ernste Gesaenge* are poor. And I must mention that Flagstad's voice becomes thin and shrill from D at the top of the staff upward. This is, then, a record for those who love Brahms more unreservedly than I; and London A-4225, with all of Act 3 of *Die Walkuere* and the *Todesverkuendigung* Scene of Act 2, is similarly for those who love Wagner in that way. For them I report that one is struck immediately by the exaggeratedly resonant and excessively sharp and harsh recorded sound, which can be made less unpleasant by drastic reduction of treble; and that with Flagstad's Bruennhilde, lustrous-voiced in the lower range of the part and less beautiful in the higher, the recording offers Edelmann's dry-voiced Wotan, Svanholm's threadbare-voiced Siegfried, Marianne Schech's tremulous-voiced Sieglinde, and the Vienna Philharmonic under the occasionally somewhat gigantesque direction of Solti.

The tenor who has stood out among all others in the way Flagstad has stood out among sopranos is Bjoerling. He has done so, first of all, like Caruso in an earlier period, by virtue of the exceptional nature of the voice itself — its unique timbre and extraordinary range and power; but in addition Bjoerling has used his voice with a musical taste and style that Caruso didn't—and Bjoerling's Italian contemporaries don't—have. His

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singing of the Duke, then, makes the new Verdi *Rigoletto* on RCA Victor LM-6051 worth acquiring; and the singing of the other principals, though less distinguished, is acceptable. The velvet is gone from Merrill's baritone, but he sings the title role with a restraint in volume and a care in expressive phrasing that one is grateful for; and one has a similar gratitude for singing by Roberta Peters, the Gilda, that is without its normal aggressiveness. The beautiful voices of Tozzi and Anna Maria Rota are heard in the small parts of Sparafucile and Maddalena; and the performance—with the Rome Opera Orchestra and Chorus—is conducted well by Perlea. There are objectionable cuts—not only the usual one in the scene of the Duke and his courtiers in Act 3, but one of Rigoletto's *Ah! veglia, o donna* in Act 2—these presumably to get the work onto two records; and this also necessitates an atrocious break at the end of side 2.

London X5320, *An Evening at the Lyric Opera of Chicago,* gives us part of a concert. With the orchestra conducted by Solti, Tebaldi is heard in the Letter Scene from Tchaikovsky's *Eugene Onegin,* in which she begins poorly but warms up into very beautiful singing that is curiously Italian in style as well as language; and her singing is even more beautiful in music in which she is more at home—*"L'altra notte"* from Boito's *Mefistofele,* Simionato's mezzo-soprano is sumptuous in superb performances of *"Voi che sapete"* from Mozart's *Figaro* and *"Mon coeur"* from Saint-Saens' *Samson* (in Italian). And the rest is an aria from Mascagni's *Cavalleria* (Simionato), a duet from Ponchielli's *La Gioconda* (Tebaldi and Simionato), and an aria from Giordano's *Andrea Chénier* (Bastianini).

HIGHLY distinguished is Lisa Della Casa's singing, on London 5260, of Schubert's *Auf dem Wasser zu singen, Der Fruehling, Du bist die Ruh'* and *Gretchen am Spinnrade,* and songs of Brahms, Wolf and Strauss that include Wolf's *Begegnung* and *Geh', Geliebter, geh' jezt!* and Strauss' *Befreit.* Distinguished too are most of Fischer-Dieskau's performances with Gerald Moore, on Angel 35474, of songs of Wolf; but some are flawed by over-emphatic details. The songs include a number of those that merely articulate and point up the words so remarkably, but others—*Lebewohl, In der Fruehe* and *Fussreise* (Moerike), *Verschwiegene Liebe* (Eichendorff), *Phaenomen* and *Anakreon's Grab* (Goethe)—which are in addition beautiful and affecting pieces of music. And among the better of the 17 Brahms songs that are performed admirably by Hotter and Moore on Angel 35397 are three of the best—*Botschaft, Minnelied* and *Sapphische Ode.*

Lotte Lehmann's early performances reissued on Victor CAL-378 include several of her best—of Beethoven's *Ich liebe dich,* Schubert's *An die Musik* and *Der Erlkoenig,* Brahms' *Botschaft,* Wolf's *In dem Schatten meiner Locken* and *Anakreon's Grab;* and though Victor's "enhancement" by echo-chamber causes them to trail the reverberation of distant empty halls, the timbre of the lovely voice is unaltered. But Ponselle's sumptuous voice is altered in most of the performances in CBL-100 by "enhancement" that appears to include peaking of treble; for the timbre is more nearly accurate with a 6-kc cut-off or with treble knob drastically turned down. The same is true of the early Pinza performances on CAL-401; but the excessively bright *Ernani* and excessively muffled *Faust* can't be made to sound right.

These are great singers; but one of the greatest, the soprano Frieda Hempel, who sang in Toscanini's first American performance of Beethoven's Ninth in 1913, has been represented in the Victor catalogue by only one performance in a de luxe limited edition of vocal recordings (now withdrawn)—a performance of *"Qui la voce"* from Bellini's *I Puritani* whose stylistic continence makes the heavily underscored Callas performance sound crude and absurd. It has remained for Rococo Records of Toronto to issue an LP record devoted to Hempel; and though it gives us not the musically distinguished HMV and Victor performances of her maturity but earlier Odeon and HMV performances that include a number of exhibitions of vocal acrobatics in inconsequential music, it also gives us in the arias from Auber's *La Muette de Portici* and Meyerbeer's *Robert le Diable* (in German) examples of the exquisite deployment of the lovely voice in cantilena that she was capable of, as well as her dazzling execution of florid passages.

On another Rococo record are several early recordings by Elisabeth Schumann—of Zerlina's arias from Mozart's *Don Giovanni* and the Jewel Song from Gounod's *Faust* (in German, and with raucous orchestral accompaniments), among other things—which enable one to hear the voice with the amplitude and bloom it had at first, and used with flawless musical art even then.

B. H. HAGGIN

Notes on Contributors

DANIEL BELL is labor editor of *Fortune.* CARL KAYSEN is on the economics faculty of Harvard. STANLEY KAUFFMANN has written about films for numerous periodicals.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

though plenty of disagreements, for which Mr. Watts has laid a solid basis by his lucid exposition of the practical, non-absolutist approach to politics. The trouble is that ideologues, especially those left of center, rarely admit to such flawed and modest aims as Mr. Watt takes for granted. When I criticised the New Deal for not making any "important" changes in people's everyday living, it was not only because I'm a purist but also because the New Dealers used to talk as if it had; and my "endless baiting" of Henry Wallace and the liberal weeklies will perhaps appear to have some justification if Mr. Watts will look up the enormous moral claims made by Wallace and the liberals in the forties. This is not to deny my political impracticality, merely to suggest it perhaps was more relevant to actuality than Mr. Watts' extremely intelligent review sometimes seems to imply.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

New York, N.Y.

► *Statehood for the Territories*

SIRS:

IF TRB (March 10) wishes to express his views on the future status of our two incorporated territories, Alaska and Hawaii, I express the hope that he will not, by elision, slant his comment.

He wrote: "The Gallup Poll shows 73 percent of Americans favor Alaska statehood, 65 percent Hawaii statehood."

The Gallup Poll published March 2, to be sure, showed that 73 percent favor statehood for Alaska, 6 percent oppose, and 21 percent have no opinion. Those who have no opinion scarcely count, in any estimate of public sentiment. The essential ratio is 73-6, something over 12-1. In Hawaii's case the corresponding figures are 65-12, or slightly better than 5-1. TRB adds: "This column is in a lonely minority still thinking commonwealth status (like Puerto Rico) would be preferable for non-contiguous areas."

His expression "Like Puerto Rico" signifies an impossibility.

1. The people of Puerto Rico desire commonwealth status and have voted for it. The people of Alaska want statehood, and have voted for it.

2. Puerto Rico was annexed, and remained an "insular possession," meaning an indeterminate status, until Congress decided what to do with it. Congress wisely decided to give the people of Puerto Rico the status they wanted.

3. Alaska became an *incorporated* territory, and according to the Supreme Court, "an inchoate state," through Acts of both Houses of Congress, 1867-69. Thereby Alaska became irrevocably incorporated, a part of, the Union. It cannot be given independence as were the Philippines, or some special status "like Puerto Rico." It can be kept in its present colonial status as a territory, or it can be promoted to statehood by Act of Congress. There are no other alternatives.

Alaska cannot (under the equality clause of the Constitution) therefore, be relieved of all federal taxation "like Puerto Rico," which never paid any federal taxes. Alaskans now pay *all* federal taxes, bearing the major burdens of statehood, but not enjoying the rights and responsibilities thereof.

What the people of Alaska want is the fulfillment of the 91-year-old pledge made in the Treaty of Cession: "The inhabitants . . . of the ceded Territory shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States."

ERNEST GRUENING

Washington, D. C.

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